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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MGB-A-6463

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FOR SECRET  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, Foreign Division M

DATE: 9 July 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

EYES ONLY

WJH  
2 FEB 1958

OUT 62202

SUBJECT: GENERAL -

SPECIFIC. Security Measures Necessary for the Protection  
of BOB in the Present Crisis

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OUT CABLE  
ATTACHED

1. Introduction.

The Korean incident, in my judgment, can at any time in the future, if the Russians so decide, spread to other areas where the U.S. position is weak or untenable, either through direct Russian intervention, or, and this is the more likely case, through intervention by the Satellite military or paramilitary forces. Although the political developments in the Soviet Zone of Germany are not ripe yet for such intervention, the strategy of the Kremlin in the present phase of the world crisis might necessitate such intervention at any time. As long as such action takes place through the Volkspolizei, we can count on at least 24 hours notice. Should the action, however, coincide with the start of a Russian-American war, and therefore involve Russian troops, I believe that from a tactical point the operation can be organized by the Russians without any leak occurring prior to the occupation of Berlin. The troops at present in and around Berlin are sufficient in number and strength for an immediate and unopposed occupation, especially if they should not be reinforced prior to such action.

Our entire planning for crises in the past has been mainly concerned with continuity of operations, security of files, evacuation of sensitive German personnel, possible evacuation of American dependents, placing of stay behind radios and intelligence nets, etc. We have never attacked in a serious fashion the problem posed for the staff, dependents, files, etc., for the case in which we have little or no notice prior to the occupation of the city, with all means of organized retreat and evacuation eliminated. Such a situation would arise with the occupation of Berlin by enemy forces, be they Russian and/or Germans, and such occupation would have as one of its prime purposes the capture of American personnel and files, in order to assess American plans and capabilities, as well as to eliminate Western intelligence penetration of the Satellite World, at present based on Berlin.

Distribution

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DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
BY \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE: 27 MAY 1951  
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The planning of the U.S. Headquarters (USCOB and HICOG) in Berlin is still premised on a situation where enough time would be available to be able to evacuate by air both dependents and sensitive personnel, and have enough notice, or be able to withhold complete occupation long enough, to destroy all sensitive files. A cold appraisal of the military situation in Berlin shows the fallacy of these plans. Troops at present in Berlin are inadequate for even the most elementary delay action (especially since occupation, in all likelihood, will not occur during an alert). All three airfields in Western Berlin, furthermore, can be put under artillery and mortar fire on short notice, to make them absolutely useless five minutes after the attack on Western Berlin starts.

The problem we must prepare ourselves for, is therefore:

Set up a plan to be able to destroy all files on ten minutes notice, and in ten minutes, and be able to have all personnel disappear automatically upon the occupation of Berlin, without the necessity of last minute briefings, opening of envelopes left sealed until such time (DOGPATCH), etc. Each member of BOB should be fully briefed and documented so if he sees the Russian troops advancing down the street some morning, he knows exactly what to do. The plan I will present here should be implemented during the next four weeks and should receive precedence over all other operational matters. Its implementation is essential for the security of all present and future operations, which would be automatically blown by the capture of the files and/or of staff personnel. The assurance it will give the staff during the present and future crisis periods, will greatly help to augment the morale, and increase production and efficiency.

We should under no circumstances rely on any plans drawn up by the Military Post in Berlin, since we must be swayed by entirely different considerations from those guiding the Military Post. We cannot afford to have our personnel captured in toto by the enemy, even less can we afford to have them stick together, which would make the job of the enemy CE service a simple one. We must be guided by principles of dispersal and our covers must be thought up with imagination and resourcefulness. Since the capture of Berlin, would, furthermore, unleash a war between Russia and the U.S., we must consider each one of our staff members a potential agent in enemy territory.

## 2. Security of Files and Installation.

Up to this date we have not seen any really efficient method or way to destroy files. The best way, we are told, is to throw the files in a pile, pour over them a combination of gasoline and oil, give them plenty of air, and then hope they will all burn. All other ways and means have to date been found inadequate. (If Washington knows of a better way, please advise.) Under this prehistoric method it would take us the better part of a day to destroy all the files and cards at present in Berlin. Logically, therefore, the only secure way to assure the security of the files is to get rid of them. This will cut down our efficiency, especially as far as correspondence

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with Karlsruhe and Washington is concerned, but security should be the only guiding consideration at present in Berlin. We therefore plan, with the approval of Karlsruhe and Washington, to evacuate the bulk of our files to Karlsruhe and retain in Berlin only the absolute minimum, which will be kept in one file cabinet, and can be destroyed at any time by the CQ on duty, who will be furnished with full instructions as to what to do in case of an invasion of Berlin. 1/11/48

This will necessitate Karlsruhe setting up our files in their offices and giving us basic reference services, so smooth correspondence can be continued between Berlin, Washington, Karlsruhe and the other bases in Germany. This brings up the necessity of not needlessly complicating correspondence by references to past correspondence and reports by numbers. OK

To assure the security of the crypto file and other crypto material it must be kept in the safe at present in the CQ's office, so it can be destroyed with the other sensitive material. Washington should therefore give us early clearance for this change in Commo security. 1/11/48

It has also been suggested that the Headquarters building be mined and blown up at the appropriate moment. I, personally, am against such a proposition. For one thing the Headquarters building is extremely solidly built; for another the bomb might be let off before the files are destroyed. Simplicity in instructions is essential for the last, highly nervous ten to thirty minutes of Berlin. 1/11/48

It is also thought inadvisable to try to set the Headquarters building on fire, since it is a modern, fireproof construction. I even doubt that the destruction of files would do that trick. 1/11/48

### 3. Personnel.

#### A. Cover.

It is very late in the day to discuss this particular sub-heading of personnel planning. I consider it, however, still pertinent that we attempt to get some of our personnel at present in Berlin into appropriate cover, 1/11/48  
and this particularly pertains to the non- or bad German speakers, depends on the quality of their cover. The lack of same, would not only mean their immediate capture, but also, undoubtedly, their detailed interrogation by the Russians. Cover, of a different complexion however, will also be discussed a bit lower in the escape and evasion phase of this discussion.

It is appropriate in connection with cover to also examine the possibility of putting some of the personnel back into uniform and having them assigned to troop units or headquarters offices in Berlin. There are still a large number of EMs and officers in Berlin, so that an absorption of personnel could probably be arranged. Some of the military assignments, furthermore, will permit a large amount of time to be spent outside any routine duty, if the cover is laid on properly. (Such as Judge Advocate General.) 1/11/48

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*approved*

I cannot overemphasize the importance of cover at this time again. My earlier discussion on this matter went into the morale factor of cover at quite some length. The present situation might continue for practically years. The staff will be conscious over months if not years that at any moment the city might be taken by the Russians, which would spell inescapable capture, torture, death or fate comparable or worse than death. We all know that we are expendable, it is however important for the continued efficiency of personnel to provide for each and everyone of the staff members a sporting chance of survival. Our personnel is resourceful and most of them are tough, and with their particular brand of optimism, they will survive if given a chance.

B. Escape and Evasion.

The majority of our personnel, however, must be prepared to assume a different identity the minute an invasion of Berlin takes place. For the assumption of such an identity, extensive preparations must be made months ahead of time, caches must be prepared, etc., etc. The different ways and means which come first to mind, and which can and must be varied, are the following:

I. For non-German speaking personnel:

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Some non-German speaking personnel should be provided with false AGO cards, and with leave Travel Orders, completed on a typewriter readily available to them and duly signed, but not yet dated, giving them permission to visit Berlin on leave. They should furthermore find, or be helped in finding, an American family in Berlin, not connected with intelligence, which would be willing to accept them as a visitor from the zone, a friend staying with them on leave. Preparations naturally must include a packed suitcase at all times, with which the person can go to the friends, who should live near enough to the present billet to be reached on foot. An alternative would naturally be a suitcase permanently placed at the safe address.

Another way would be the wholesale adoption of our secretarial staff by families in Berlin, becoming overnight, or maybe already earlier (?) dependent children. *already*

The enlisted men<sup>\*</sup> should be integrated already at this time into the present EM set-up of BMP, so they can be readily absorbed should Berlin be captured. Since the occupation of Berlin would undoubtedly coincide with the active armed intervention of the U.S., some personnel might be provided with Air Force uniforms and equipment, go completely underground for a couple of days and then appear as a shutdown American pilot, who has found his way to the big city. Detailed briefing as to field of

*\* Can be covered by EMB support*

~~REDACTED~~

*Can be covered by EMB support  
also covered by EMB support  
as covered*

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origin, type of plan, specialty (Stars and Stripes correspondent) circumstances of being shot down, how way was made back, etc., would have to be worked out, but this alternative has the advantage of being completely safe in the past history in Germany.

All the alternatives above envisage the personnel concerned falling into Russian and/or German hands as PWs. They cannot survive on the German economy for reasons of language and custom, therefore they must choose this way, which will probably be the easiest, since the Russians will no doubt create or try to create a "National Committee Free America" from the bulk of personnel they might capture in a possible battle for Berlin.

II. For German speaking personnel, fluent or near fluent:

Such personnel should be provided already at this time with German documentation, German clothing, cover story, safe houses, escape routes, letter drops, rendezvous points, radio links, caches of arms, money and supplies.

The German speaking personnel to the largest extent is the most experienced operational personnel and like pilots at time of war, should if possible be returned to or through our own lines for continued operation, or should this prove impossible should be committed as organizers in enemy territory. Their cover story and documentation must be good, their plans must cover all and any eventuality.

Their documentation should fall into two fields: Commercial travellers and/or tourists in Berlin from Western Germany or from some other country in Western Europe or South America (we have, for instance a staff member who speaks fluent Spanish, some who speak fluent French, some who speak other languages). Their cover story must include private citizens with whom they are staying (safe houses), documentation for the type of business they are transacting (prospecting, samples, etc.), and clothing to fit into their cover story. If they are Western Germans, they should volunteer as soon as possible for whatever work details are organized in order to disappear into the landscape, if they are foreigners they must wait to be returned to their native country.

The other alternative in this line is the documentation with Berlin papers necessitating already at this time starting to live a double life. This would involve obtaining a room on the German economy, a cover employment, some neighborly relationships and starting, in a double life, to blend into the landscape. This is of course very much harder than the first alternative, but can be done, especially if one becomes a boarder with a family one knows, who is fully briefed and starts the fiction now, without too much activity required at present by the person going under cover.

III. Help for all plans of escape and evasion needed from Washington, Karlsruhe and TAD:

a. Basic approval by cable to start working out plans individually with each staff member and their dependents.

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b. Documentation support from Washington, advising us, if it is feasible to get South American or Western European passports, and how long it would take to get them, and what information is necessary for their procurement.

c. Help from TAD in procuring Western German identity documents, interzonal passes with appropriate stamps, basic information for cover stories, which can be supplemented by personal visits of persons being documented, passports, secret inks, concealment devices, etc.

d. Help from Executive Office, Karlsruhe, in procurement of false AGO cards, leave travel orders, information on different sections in EUCOM for cover stories, Military AGO cards, and basic arrangement for integration of personnel into the Berlin Military Post or other Military set-up, as Military personnel.

e. Help from Washington in provision of the following equipment for caches: food that can be cached in the open without spoiling, arms and ammunition packed in such a fashion that the weather will not harm it, JOAN and ELINOR radio sets with courses of instruction and signal plans for their use, approval to cache money, to buy for each member going underground a whole outfit of German clothing, suitcase, toilet articles, etc. (will roughly cost equivalent of \$150.00 in each case), provision of escape and safe house plans outside of Germany.

f. Provision of addresses of safe houses, details on caches, etc., in Western Germany to be provided by Karlsruhe.

#### IV. Lethal tablets:

All personnel going underground, and all personnel who so desire, should furthermore be given a lethal tablet for their use in case of capture under adverse circumstances.

4. The approval, comment and help in above plan is requested from Karlsruhe and Washington.

ASM:cvg